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*Cov. L.J. 66  Facts  
The complainant gave evidence that she lived in a one bedroom flat and had met the 
appellant through a former girlfriend of his. She said that the appellant visited her flat to 
take drugs with her and that, on occasion, their relationship was sexual, but she found him 
frightening. In March 2006 the appellant had gained access by kicking down the door. He 
then moved a television set and commode into the bedroom and told the complainant to 
remain in there. She was frightened of him and initially did as she was told. The following 
day she tried to leave the flat but he dragged her back by her hair. He occasionally left the 
flat for short periods and on Friday, 17 March went out to the doctor's surgery. She did not 
leave the flat at this time as the surgery was in sight of the flat and she said she was too 
frightened to leave. That evening she ran away to the house of a friend, Declan. The 
following evening, 18 March, the appellant arrived at Declan's house. The complainant said 
the appellant was very angry and dragged her into the hall by her shoulders, catching her 
neck and the back of her head on a fire extinguisher. He then banged her head against a 
wall and tried to strangle her. The police were called but she did not, at that stage, 
complain of any injuries. However, the following day she attended the police station and 
reported the appellant's behaviour. The police noticed scratches on her neck and found 
blood in the hall of Declan's house. However, the complainant declined to submit to a 
medical examination. 
The appellant gave evidence that the complainant was his girlfriend and that they smoked 
crack cocaine together. He said he had been sleeping at her flat but spent days away from 
it and never prevented the complainant from leaving the flat. He said there had been no 
arguments and no violence. He had visited the doctor's on 17 March, the complainant had 
left of her own accord to go to Declan's house, and the complainant had invented the 
allegations of assault and false imprisonment. 
 *Cov. L.J. 67  The appellant had many previous convictions, including a number for 
violence and dishonesty, and at trial the Crown sought, and obtained permission, to adduce 
two previous convictions. The first was for actual bodily harm of a former girlfriend and the 
second was for the battery of his then current girlfriend. These convictions were for 
behaviour including hair pulling, grabbing by the throat and strangulation. He pleaded 
guilty on both occasions. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 has seven gateways through which 
evidence of bad character might be adduced and the Crown sought to adduce the evidence 
of the previous convictions under section 101(1)(d) Criminal Justice Act 2003 on the basis 
that the previous convictions showed a propensity to commit acts of violence towards 
women. 
With regard to the issue of bad character the judge directed the jury that they must not 
convict the appellant only on the basis of the bad character but that they could use the 
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previous convictions to help resolve the issue of whether or not he had a propensity, or 
tendency, to be violent towards women. The judge further directed the jury that they could 
use the evidence of the two previous convictions to decide whether the appellant's 
testimony had been truthful i.e. that it was relevant to his credibility as a witness, and 
when deciding whether the appellant was guilty of the offence charged. The jury retired to 
consider their verdict and two and a half hours after retiring they sent two questions to the 
judge. The second question was as follows: 
“What was the significance of revealing the defendant's two previous assault convictions? 
Anything else we should know?” 
The judge discussed with counsel how he should answer the question and it was agreed 
that he should say there was nothing else they should know. It was also agreed that the 
judge should repeat his earlier direction to the jury. After the jury had retired for a second 
time defence counsel raised the issue as to whether it had been appropriate for the judge 
to indicate that the jury could take into account the appellant's bad character when 
deciding whether or not he had been truthful. The appellant was convicted. 
The primary ground of appeal was that the fact that the appellant had two previous 
convictions, to which he had pleaded guilty, had no bearing on his propensity to tell the 
truth. The judge should not have directed the jury that his previous convictions *Cov. L.J. 
68  might have relevance to his credibility. This was a material misdirection that rendered 
the jury's verdict unsafe. The defence argued that when directing the jury as to the 
relevance of the evidence regard should be had to the gateway(s) through which the 
evidence was or could have been adduced. 
 Decision  
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 introduced a number of gateways through which evidence of 
bad character could be admitted and the Court of Appeal was of the view that the change 
in the law brought about by the 2003 Act was occasion for simplifying the direction to juries 
in relation to such evidence. Where evidence of bad character is introduced the jury should 
be given assistance as to its relevance that is tailored to the facts of the individual case and 
that relevance can normally be deduced by the application of common sense. The Court 
rejected the defence submission that the jury could only use evidence of bad character for 
a particular purpose if it could have been introduced through the relevant gateway. Once 
admitted through a gateway it was open to the jury to attach significance to it in any 
respect in which it is relevant. To direct them only to have regard to it for some purposes 
and to disregard its relevance in other respects would be to revert to the unsatisfactory 
position that existed under the old law. It had been made clear in R v Highton and others 
[2005] EWCA Crim 1985 that the use to which character evidence may be put depends on 
the matters to which it is relevant rather than the gateway through which it was admitted. 
The Court was of the view that a jury's common sense may tell them that it is more likely 
that the defendant committed the offence with which he is charged if he has previous 
convictions, particularly where it is shown that he has a propensity for committing offences 
of the same nature as the one with which he is currently charged. The distinction between 
propensity to offend and credibility is an unrealistic distinction and a jury may well conclude 
at the same time that it is more likely he is guilty and he is less likely to be telling the truth 
when he says he is not. The bad character in this case was admitted under the gateway in 
s.101(1)(d) which renders such evidence admissible where it is ‘relevant to an important 
matter in issue between the prosecution and the defence’ and s.103(1)(b) provides that 
such matters include ‘the question whether the defendant has a propensity to be 
untruthful, except where it is not suggested that the defendant's case is not untruthful in 
any respect.’ The Court of Appeal considered that it would be comparatively rare for the 
case of a defendant who has pleaded not guilty not to involve some element that the *Cov. 
L.J. 69  prosecution suggest is untruthful. However, it did not follow that whenever there 
is an issue as to whether the defendant's case is truthful, evidence can be admitted to show 
that he has a propensity to be untruthful. If the jury apply common sense they will 
conclude that a defendant who has committed a criminal offence may well be prepared to 
lie about it, even if he has not shown a propensity for lying, whereas a defendant who has 
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not committed the offence charged will be more likely to tell the truth, even if he has shown 
a propensity for telling lies. In other words, whether or not the defendant is telling the truth 
to the jury is likely to depend simply on whether or not he has committed the offence and 
the jury should focus on this issue. The Court of Appeal felt that for this reason the only 
circumstance in which telling lies is likely to be an important matter in issue between the 
prosecution and the defence under s. 101(1)(d) is where telling lies is an element of the 
offence charged. 
The Court also considered in some depth the direction to the jury. The Judicial Studies 
Board's specimen direction in relation to bad character directs the judge to identify the 
gateway through which the bad character has been admitted by reference to the wording 
of the Act. The Court of Appeal questioned whether this was the most desirable way in 
which to direct the jury. They felt that reciting to the jury the statutory wording in relation 
to the relevant gateway was not likely to be helpful. If the jury were told in simple language 
and with reference, where appropriate, to the particular facts of the case, why the bad 
character evidence might be relevant, that would necessarily encompass the gateway by 
which the evidence was admitted. The Court was of the view that in the rare case where the 
bad character evidence had been admitted because the defendant's propensity to be 
untruthful was a matter in issue between the prosecution and the defence, the direction 
should explain the relevance of the evidence with reference to the particular facts of the 
case that make that matter important. Equally the Court questioned whether it was helpful 
to tell the jury that they could, if they thought it right, ‘take the evidence into account when 
deciding whether or not the defendant committed the offences with which he is charged’. 
The Court pointed out that the only reason the jury had heard the evidence was that it 
might assist them in deciding that question and they felt the jury did not need to be told 
this in those terms. It was noted that it is of course highly desirable that the jury should be 
warned not to attach too much weight to the bad character evidence, let alone conclude 
that the defendant is guilty simply because of his bad character. The Court concluded that 
the judge had given the jury the Judicial Studies Board's specimen direction without 
relating them to the facts of the case and that this was unlikely to have been very helpful. 
However, they did not consider that the judge's *Cov. L.J. 70  direction could have led the 
jury astray and that it could not have affected the jury's verdict. 
The appeal was, therefore, dismissed. 
 Commentary  
The law relating to admissibility of evidence as to the bad character of both defendants and 
non-defendants was amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This case is of interest not 
so much for admissibility through gateway (d) or even the use to which the evidence can be 
put; but for the somewhat unusual criticism of the Judicial Studies Board's specimen 
direction. 
The difficulty with the bad character of the defendant is the extent to which it is relevant 
and has probative value with regard to both the propensity of the defendant to commit the 
offence and to his credibility as a witness. The admissibility of bad character is considered 
to be prejudicial to the defendant. There is a risk that the jury or magistrates may give 
more weight to the evidence than its relevance justifies and that its prejudicial effect may 
outweigh its probative value. As a consequence, in English criminal law the general rule is 
that such evidence is inadmissible prior to a finding of guilt. This is in contrast to 
continental Europe where the court is routinely informed about the previous convictions of 
the defendant. 
Prior to the 2003 Act the bad character of the defendant was admissible primarily either 
under the similar fact doctrine or the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. Where such evidence 
was admissible as similar fact the evidence was deemed to be directly relevant to the issue 
of guilt and the jury were directed accordingly. In contrast, where bad character was 
brought out in cross-examination, under the 1898 Act this evidence was primarily relevant 
to the credibility of the defendant and not directly relevant to the issue of guilt. Therefore 
prior to the 2003 Act the use to which the bad character evidence could be put depended on 
the means by which it had been put before the court. 
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Under the 2003 Act evidence of the defendant's bad character remains generally 
inadmissible prior to a finding of guilt but the Act provides seven gateways, under s.101(1), 
through which such evidence may be admitted if it fits the relevant criteria. One question 
before the Court in Campbell was whether the use to which the *Cov. L.J. 71  evidence 
could be put depended on the gateway through which it was admitted. In this case the 
relevant gateway used to admit two of the defendant's previous convictions was 
s.101(1)(d). This gateway renders the bad character admissible where ‘it is relevant to an 
important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution’. This gateway is 
supplemented by s.103 which indicates that for the purpose of gateway (d) the matters in 
issue between the defendant and the prosecution include the question whether the 
defendant has a propensity to commit offences of the kind charged and the question 
whether the defendant has a propensity to be untruthful. In Campbell, the prosecution 
submitted that two of the defendant's previous convictions showed a propensity to commit 
acts of violence against women and the previous convictions were admitted on the basis. 
When directing the jury with regard to the previous convictions the judge referred to their 
relevance to both propensity and credibility. The previous convictions were clearly relevant 
to propensity and admitted on that basis but the defence raised the question as to whether 
it had been correct for the judge to direct the jury that they could also be relevant to 
credibility. The Court of Appeal cited and followed Highton. In this case the Court made it 
clear that the use to which the evidence could be put depended on its relevance and not on 
the gateway through which it had been admitted. In Highton the issue concerned previous 
convictions admissible under gateway (g) ‘the defendant has made an attack on another 
person's character’. Under the old law such evidence was admissible as relevant to the 
credibility of the accused i.e. his truthfulness as a witness, and would not have been 
directly relevant to the issue of guilt. The Court of Appeal's ruling in Highton indicated that 
if the bad character was also relevant directly to the issue of guilt it could be used in this 
way irrespective of the gateway through which it was admitted. Highton had previous 
convictions for offences of dishonesty and violence, which were considered relevant to his 
propensity to commit the offences of kidnapping, robbery and theft with which he was 
charged. It is, therefore, clear that the use to which bad character evidence can be put 
does not depend on the reason for admissibility or the gateway through which it was 
admitted - the only question is what is it relevant to? 
The jury need to be given assistance as to the relevance of the bad character that is tailored 
to the facts of the case, hence the direction to the jury is of key importance. It is with 
regard to this issue that this case is notable. The Court of Appeal in Campbell impliedly 
criticised the Judicial Studies Board's specimen direction indicating that part of it was not 
likely to be helpful to the jury and indicating that the direction must relate *Cov. L.J. 
72  to the facts of the case. Lord Philips CJ indicated, in a departure from previous 
decisions, that a trial judge's failure to provide a jury direction in accordance with a 
relevant specimen direction should no longer be treated as an automatic ground of appeal 
or automatically to allow an appeal. Judges must consider whether a jury would have 
reached the same conclusion by the application of common sense to the evidence. In R v 
Meyer [2006] EWCA Crim 1126 the appellant had been convicted of causing grievous bodily 
harm with intent. The appellant hit the victim fracturing his cheekbone and at trial claimed 
he had acted in self-defence. 
Evidence was given that the appellant had a previous conviction for unlawful wounding and 
one for causing actual bodily harm, and had pleaded guilty on both occasions. The judge 
directed the jury that the previous convictions were potentially relevant to credibility. On 
appeal it was noted that the prosecution and defence had agreed that the previous 
convictions were not relevant to credibility. Although the Court of Appeal recognised that 
bad character, once introduced, could have relevance to issues beyond those that led to its 
admission, it was of the view that in this case previous convictions for violence, to which 
the appellant had pleaded guilty, could not have any meaningful impact on his credibility 
and the appeal was allowed. Although, on appeal, the defence submitted that Campbell 
was on all fours with Meyer the Court of Appeal felt that it was not helpful to rely on 
previous decisions on particular facts as if they were legal precedents, and that in Campbell 
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the summing-up could not have had any impact on the safety of the verdict. It is clear from 
Meyer and Campbell that although bad character may be used for any purpose to which it 
is relevant the judge must ensure a clear direction to the jury. The judge should ensure 
that he only directs the jury to both propensity and credibility if the bad character admitted 
could have a meaningful impact on both issues. A misdirection by the judge or failure to 
follow the Judicial Studies Board's specimen direction will not automatically lead to a 
successful appeal; what matters is whether the jury might have come, through common 
sense, to the same conclusion and ultimately whether the summing-up could have had any 
impact on the safety of the verdict. 
Beverley Steventon, Head of Law, Coventry University 
Cov. L.J. 2007, 12(2), 66-72 
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